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 ABSTRACT    
 
Securitization was meant to disperse credit risk to those who were better able to bear it.  In 
practice, securitization appears to have concentrated the risks in the financial intermediary sector 
itself. This paper outlines an accounting framework for the financial system for assessing the impact 
of securitization on financial stability. If securitization leads to the lengthening of intermediation 
chains, then risks become concentrated in the intermediary sector with damaging consequences for 
financial stability. Covered bonds are one form of securitization that do not fall foul of this principle. I 
discuss the role of countercyclial capital requirements and the Spanish-style statistical provisioning in 
mitigating the harmful effects of lengthening intermediation chains. For Korea, the stability of 
funding emerges as a key consideration. Covered bonds may play a role in stabilizing the funding 
arrangement for banks. 
 
 
 
 
대출자산의 증권화는 자산부실위험을 분산
시키려는 취지로 도입하였으나 실제로는 자산
부실을 키우고 금융중개부문의 취약성을 키우
는 결과를 낳았다. 본 논문은 증권화와 자산
부실 문제를 다룰 수 있는 금융제도 전반의
위험을 분석할 수 있는 회계 프레임워크를 고
려한다. 미국의 증권화제도는 긴 중개사슬을
 
낳았고, 위기 시에 취약한 구조가 되었다. 
유럽에서 사용되는 커버드본드 제도는 짧은 
중개제도와 부합하는 제도로서 금융제도의 
안정성에 도움이 된다. 한국의 금융제도도 
부채의 안정성을 감안할 때 커버드본드의 
혜택을 볼 수 있을 것으로 예상된다. 
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I . Introduction 
 
 
The recent financial crisis has the distinction of being the first post-securitization 
crisis in which banking and capital market developments have been closely 
intertwined. Historically, banks have always reacted to changes in the external 
environment, expanding and contracting lending in reaction to shifts in economic 
conditions. However, in a market-based financial system built on securitization, 
banking and capital market developments are inseparable, and the current crisis is a 
live illustration of the potency of the interaction between the two. 
Securitization was meant to disperse credit risk to those who were better able to 
bear it, but in the financial crisis the risks appear to have been concentrated in the 
financial intermediary sector itself, rather than with the final investors. To 
understand the true role played by securitization in the financial crisis, we need to 
dispose of two pieces of received wisdom concerning securitization - one old and 
one new. The old view, now discredited, emphasized the positive role played by 
securitization in dispersing credit risk, thereby enhancing the resilience of the 
financial system to defaults by borrowers. 
But having disposed of this old conventional wisdom, the fashion now is to 
replace it with a new one that emphasizes the chain of unscrupulous operators who 
passed on bad loans to the greater fool next in the chain. We could dub this new 
fashionable view the hot potato hypothesis, since the bad loan is like a hot potato 
passed down the chain. The idea is attractively simple, and there is a convenient 
villain to blame, and so has figured in countless speeches given by central bankers 
and politicians on the causes of the subprime crisis. 
But the new conventional wisdom is just as flawed as the old one. Not only does 
it fall foul of the fact that securitization worked well for thirty years before the 
subprime crisis, it fails to distinguish between selling a bad loan down the chain and 
issuing  liabilities backed by bad loans. By selling a bad loan, you get rid of the bad  
loan and it's someone else's problem. In this sense, the hot potato is passed down the 
chain to the greater fool next in the chain. However, the second action has a different 
consequence. By issuing liabilities against bad loans, you do not get rid of the bad 
loan. The hot potato is sitting on your balance sheet or on the books of the special 
purpose vehicles that you are sponsoring. Thus, far from passing the hot potato 
down the chain to the greater fool next in the chain, you end up keeping the hot 
potato. In effect, the large financial intermediaries are the last in the chain. While the 
investors who buy your securities will end up losing money, the financial 
intermediaries that have issued the securities are in danger of larger losses. Since the 
intermediaries are leveraged, they are in danger of having their equity wiped out, as 
some have found to their cost. 
Indeed, Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) report that of the 
approximately 1.4 trillion dollar total exposure to subprime mortgages, around half 
of the potential losses were borne by US leveraged financial institutions, such as 
commercial banks, securities firms and hedge funds. When foreign leveraged 
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[Figure 1] Subprime exposures by type of institution (source: Greenlaw, Hatzius, 
Kashyap and Shin (2008)) 
 
 
 
[Figure 2] Short Intermediation Chain 
 
 
 
institutions are included, the total exposure of leveraged financial institutions rises to 
two thirds (see Figure 1). Far from passing on the bad loans to the greater fool next in 
the chain, the most sophisticated financial institutions amassed the largest exposures 
to the bad assets. 
A characteristic feature of financial intermediation based on the US-style 
securitization system is the long chains financial intermediaries involved in 
channeling funds from the ultimate creditors to the ultimate borrowers. The 
difference can be illustrated in figures 2 and 3. Figure 2, depicts a traditional deposit-
taking bank that collects deposits and holds mortgage assets against household 
borrowers. Until around 1990, the bulk of home mortgage assets in the United States 
were held by savings institutions and commercial banks (see Adrian and Shin (2008)).   
In recent years, however, the proportion of home mortgages held in government 
sponsored enterprise (GSE) mortgage pools have become the dominant holders.  
The chain of financial intermediation has become correspondingly much longer and 
more heavily dependent on overall capital market conditions. Figure 3 illustrates one 
possible chain of lending relationships whereby credit flows from the ultimate 
creditors (household savers) to the ultimate debtors (households who obtain a 
mortgage to buy a house). In this illustration, the mortgage asset is held in a  
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[Figure 3] Long Intermediation Chain 
 
 
 
mortgage pool - a passive firm whose sole role is to hold mortgage assets and issue 
liabilities (mortgage-backed securities, MBSs) against those assets. The mortgage-
backed securities might then be owned by an asset-backed security (ABS) issuer who 
pools and tranches the MBSs into another layer of claims, such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs). Then, a securities firm (a Wall Street investment bank, say) 
might hold CDOs on their own books for their yield, but finances such assets by 
collateralized borrowing through repurchase agreements (repos) with a larger 
commercial bank. In turn, the commercial bank would fund its lending to the 
securities firm by issuing short term liabilities, such as financial commercial paper. 
Money market mutual funds would be natural buyers of such short-term paper, and 
ultimately the money market fund would complete the circle, since household savers 
would own shares to these funds. 
Of course, the illustration in Figure 3 is a simple example of potentially much 
more complex and intertwined relationships. For instance, the same security could 
be used several times in repo lending as the lender turns round and pledges the 
same security as collateral to another lender (the practice known as re-
hypothecation). In that case, the chain would be much longer and more involved.  
Nor does the illustration take account of off-balance sheet vehicles such as structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) or ABCP conduits that the commercial bank might set up 
in order to finance the direct holding of CDOs and other asset-backed securities. 
What is noticeable from the institutions involved in Figure 3 is that they were 
precisely those institutions that were at the sharp end of the financial crisis of 2007 
and 2008. Subprime mortgages cropped up in this chain, and the failure of Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers owed to problems in the smooth function of this chain. 
This realization begs the question of what advantages can be gained by such long 
intermediation chains. 
One possible argument might be that securitization enables the dispersion of 
credit risk to those who can best bear losses. We have already commented on the 
apparent failure of this particular mechanism, but we will return to examine it more 
closely below. Leaving that to one side, another possible justification for long 
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intermediation chains is that there is an inherent need for maturity transformation in 
the financial system because ultimate creditors demand short-term claims, and that 
the process of stringing together long lending relationships make it easier to perform 
the overall maturity transformation role. 
There are well known arguments for the desirability of short-term debt for 
incentive reasons - in particular in disciplining managers. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) 
have argued that demand deposits for banking arose naturally as a response by the 
bank's owners and managers to commit not to engage in actions that dissipate the 
value of the assets, under pain of triggering a depositor run. Diamond and Rajan 
(2001) have developed this argument further, and have argued that the coordination 
problem inherent in a depositor run serves as a commitment device on the part of the 
depositors not to renegotiate in the face of opportunistic actions by the managers. 
When the bank has the right quantity of deposits outstanding, any attempt by the 
banker to extort a rent from depositors will be met by a run, which drives the 
banker's rents to zero. Foreseeing this, the banker will not attempt to extort rents. In a 
world of certainty, the bank maximizes the amount of credit it can offer by financing 
with a rigid and fragile deposit-only capital structure. 
However, in both Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), the 
focus is on traditional bank deposits, where the creditors are not financial 
intermediaries themselves. However, what is notable about the financial boom and 
bust cycle witnessed recently is that the largest fluctuations in ultra short-term debt 
has not been associated with the liabilities to retail depositors, but rather with the 
liabilities to other financial intermediaries. Adrian and Shin (2009) compare the stock 
of repurchase agreements of US primary dealers plus the stock of financial 
commercial paper expressed as a proportion of the M2 stock. M2 includes the bulk of 
retail deposits and holdings in money market mutual funds, and so is a good proxy 
for the total stock of liquid claims held by ultimate creditors against the financial 
intermediary sector as a whole. As recently as the early 1990s, repos and financial CP 
were only a quarter of the size of M2. However, the total rose rapidly reaching over 
80% of M2 by the eve of the financial crisis in August 2007, only to collapse with the 
onset of the crisis.   
The ultra-short nature of the financial intermediary obligations to each other can 
be better seen when plotting the overnight repos component of the overall repo 
series. Figure 4 plots the size of the overnight repo stock, financial commercial paper 
and M2, normalized to be equal to 1 on July 6th, 1994 (the data on overnight repos 
are not available before that date). The stock of M2 has grown by a factor of around 
2.4 since 1994, but the stock of overnight repos grew almost seven-fold up to March 
2008. Brunnermeier (2009) has noted that the use of overnight repos became so 
prevalent that, at its peak, the Wall Street investment banks were rolling over a 
quarter of their balance sheets every night. What is evident from Figure 4 is that the 
rapid growth and subsequent collapse of the overnight repos cannot be easily 
explained by the demand for short‐term liquid claims of retail depositors. 
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 [Figure 4] Overnight repos, financial commercial paper and M2 (normalized to 1 
on 6 July 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ⅱ. An Accounting Framework 
 
Consider a stylized financial system for the allocation of credit in the economy 
depicted in Figure 5. The financial system channels savings from the lenders to 
ultimate borrowers. The ultimate lenders are households, either directly or indirectly 
through institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds and life insurance 
companies. 
Some credit will be directly provided from the lender to the borrower. Treasury 
bonds or municipal bonds are a good example of such direct credit where the lender 
holds a direct claim on the borrower. However, the sizeable borrowing of the 
household sector - either mortgages or consumer debt - is almost always 
intermediated through the banking system, broadly defined. At the end of 2008, US 
household sector mortgage liabilities amounted to around $10.6 trillion, and 
consumer debt accounts for another $2.5 trillion. 
The accounting framework presented here is based on the picture of credit flow 
given in Figure 5, and is drawn from Shin (2009). There are n  financial 
intermediaries standing between the ultimate borrowers and the ultimate creditors.  
For convenience, we denote these intermediaries simply as banks. 
Denote by yi the claim held by bank i  on the ultimate borrowers, such as 
household mortgages or consumer loans. For our purposes in this paper, it does not 
matter much whether yi is in face values or market values, since the purpose of this 
paper is to outline the underlying accounting relationships within the financial  
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[Figure 5] Stylized Financial System for Credit 
 
 
 
system.  However, in what follows, it is useful to interpret all quantities as being in 
market values, since the comparative statics take on additional richness due to 
valuation effects.1 
As well as claims on the ultimate borrowers, the banks hold claims against each 
other. Denote by xi the total value of the liabilities of bank i , by xij  the value of 
bank i 's liabilities held by bank j  and by π ij  the share of bank i 's liabilities that 
are held by bank j . Denoting by ei  the value of equity of bank i , the balance sheet 
identity of bank i  is: 
 
 
(2.2) 
 
 
The left hand side is the value of assets and the right hand side is the sum of debt ( xi) 
and equity (ei). The matrix of claims and obligations between banks can then be 
depicted as below. The (i, j) th entry in the table is the debt owed by bank i  to 
bank j . Then, the i th row of the matrix can be summed to give the total value of 
debt of bank i , while the i th column of the matrix can be summed to give the total 
assets of bank i . We can give the index i + 1  to the outside creditor sector 
(households, pension funds, mutual funds etc.), so that xi,n+1 denotes bank i 's 
liabilities to the outside claimholders. Deposits would be the prime example of a 
liability that a bank has directly to outside creditors.   
                                            
1See Shin (2009) for more details on the relationship between book values and market values in an 
interconnected balance sheet network. 
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From the balance sheet identity (2.2), we can express the vector of debt values 
across the banks as follows, where Π  is the n × n  matrix where the (i, j) th entry 
is π ij . 
 
      
 
(2.3) 
 
 
                             
or more succinctly as 
  
(2.4) 
              
Solving for y , 
 
 
 
Define the leverage of bank i  as the ratio of the total value of assets to the value of 
its equity. Denote leverage by λi .  That is, 
                        
(2.5) 
 
Since xi /ei = λi −1 , we have x = e(Λ − I) , where Λ  is the diagonal matrix 
whose i th diagonal entry is λi . Thus 
 
                  (2.6) 
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Thus, the profile of total lending by the n  banks to the end-user borrowers 
depends on the interaction of three features of the financial system - the distribution 
of equity e  in the banking system, the profile of leverage Λ  and the structure of 
the financial system given by Π . Total lending to end users is increasing in equity 
and in leverage, as one would expect. More subtle is the role of the financial system, 
as given by the matrix Π . Define the vector z  as 
 
uIz )( Π−≡                                    (2.7) 
 
Where 
 
  
u ≡
1
M
1
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ ⎢ 
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥⎥
 
 
so that zi =1− π ijj=1
n∑ . In other words, zi  is the proportion of bank i 's debt 
held by the outside claimholders - the sector n + 1. Then, total lending to end-user 
borrowers yii∑  can be obtained by post-multiplying equation (2.6) by u  so that 
 
yi = eizi(λi −1)
i=1
n∑
i=1
n∑ + ei
i=1
n∑                           (2.8) 
 
Equation (2.8) is the key balance sheet identity for the financial sector as a whole, 
where all the claims and obligations between banks have been netted out. The left 
hand side is the total lending to the end-user borrowers. The second term on the 
right hand side of (2.8) is the total equity of the banking system, and the first term is 
the total funding to the banking sector provided by the outside claimholders (note 
that the second term can be written as xizii=1
n∑ ). Thus, from equation (2.8) we see 
the importance of the structure of the financial system for the supply of credit.  
Ultimately, credit supply to end-users must come either from the equity of the 
banking system, or the funding provided by non-banks. Greenlaw, Hatzius, 
Kashyap and Shin (2008) uses this framework to calibrate the aggregate 
consequences of banking sector lending contraction that results from the 
combination of capital losses and deleveraging from subprime losses. 
The aggregate balance sheet identity of the financial intermediary sector given by 
(2.8) can be explained more informally as follows. Take the balance sheet of an 
individual bank, given by Figure 6. The bank has assets against ultimate borrowers 
(loans to firms and households), but it also has assets that are claims against other 
banks. On the liabilities side, the bank has obligations to outside creditors (such as 
retail depositors), but it also has obligations to other banks. 
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[Figure 6] Balance Sheet of Individual Bank 
 
 
 
[Figure 7] Aggregate Balance Sheet of Bank Sector 
  
 
Now, consider the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector as a whole, 
where the assets are summed across individual banks and the liabilities are summed 
across the banks, also. Every liability that a bank has to another bank is an asset 
when viewed from the point of view of the lending bank. One asset cancels out 
another equal and opposite liability. In aggregate, all the claims and obligations 
across banks cancel out. Thus, in aggregate, the assets of the banking sector as a 
whole against other sectors of the economy consists of the lending to non-bank 
borrowers. This lending must be met by two sources - the total equity of the banking 
system, and the liabilities that banks have to lenders outside the banking system. 
Figure 7 illustrates. 
Equation 2.8 is a statement of the aggregate balance sheet identity. What is useful 
is the fact that equation 2.8 tells us how the leverage of the financial intermediary 
sector as a whole depends on the leverage of the individual institutions.  
The total debt liabilities of the banking sector to the household creditors can be 
expected to be sticky, and would be related to total household assets. Thus, the 
expression in the central balloon above will be slow-moving, in line with shifts in the 
total household holding of debt claims on the banking sector. For the purposes of 
short-term comparative statics, we could approximate it as being roughly constant.  
If we treat the expression in the central balloon as a constant, we learn much about 
the impact of various shifts in the parameters on the configuration of the financial 
system. We now examine two scenarios. 
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1. Boom Scenario 
 
Consider a boom scenario where the marked-to-market equity of the banks are 
healthy (that the profile of equity {ei}  is strong) and the decline in measured risks 
leads to an increase in leverage, {λi} . In order for the expression in the red balloon 
to remain constant, there must be an overall decline in {zi} , the proportion of 
funding coming from outside claimholders. In other words, banks must lend more to 
each other in order to achieve their desired risk-taking profile and leverage, given 
their strong capital position. In such a scenario, banks take on more of each others' 
debts and the intertwining of claims and liabilities become more far-reaching. The 
image is of an increasingly elaborate edifice built on the same narrow foundation, so 
that the structure becomes more and more precarious. The systemic risks therefore 
increase during the boom scenario.   
Figure 8 is the map of CoVaR measures for the conditional Value at Risk for US 
financial institutions (conditional on distress of another institution) (Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2009), IMF (2009)). Andy Haldane (2009) has recently highlighted the 
highly interconnected nature of financial institutions in the run-up to the financial 
crisis.   
Our accounting identity above shows why such closely interconnected balance 
sheets is a necessary feature of a boom scenario when banks have strong capital 
positions and measured risks are low. For any fixed pool of funding to be drawn 
from the household sector, any substantial increase in balance sheet size of the 
financial intermediaries can be achieved only by borrowing  and  lending  from  each 
other. The key variables are the {zi} , which gives the proportion of funding 
obtained from outside the intermediary sector. In order to increase the profile of 
leverage {λi}  within the intermediary sector, the banks must lower the funding 
profile {zi} , since they are competing for the same limited pool of outside funding. 
The banks can raise their risk exposure to their desired level only by borrowing and 
lending between themselves, since outside funding is inadequate to meet their growing 
needs. 
An architectural analogy is appropriate. In order to build additional rooms into a 
house whose footprint is limited by shortage of land, the only way is to build 
upward - like a skyscraper in Manhattan. The lower is the funding profile {zi} , 
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[Figure 8] US Financial Institutions’ Co-Risk Measure (source: IMF Global 
Financial Stability Report, April 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               
 
the taller is the skyscraper. However, even this analogy is somewhat misleading in 
that the Manhattan skyscraper would be planned in advance and built as a coherent 
whole. An interconnected financial system that builds upward is much less 
coordinated, and hence is liable to result in greater unintended spillover effects. It 
would be as if additional floors are built on top of existing ones, where the architects 
of lower floors did not anticipate further building on top.2 
Shortening  of  maturities  would  be  a  natural  counterpart  to  the  lengthening 
intermediation  chains.  In order  for  each  link  in  the  chain  to be a profitable  leveraged 
transaction, the funding leg of the transaction must be at a lower interest rate. When the 
yield  curve  is  upward‐sloping,  this  would  entail  funding  with  shorter  and  shorter 
maturities  at  each  step  in  the  chain.  The  prevalence  of  the  overnight  repo  as  the 
dominant funding choice for securities firms before the current crisis can be understood 
in this context. The use of ultra‐short term debt is part and parcel of long intermediation 
chains. 
The importance of the short‐term interest rate in determining the size and fragility 
                                            
2Architecturally, the closest example would be the Sutyagin house in Archangel, Russia, reported in the 
Daily Telegraph of March 7th, 2007. The 13 floor 144 feet wooden structure is described as a jumble of 
planking and the eighth wonder of the world. A Google image search for Sutyagin House yields dozens of 
photos of the structure. 
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of  the  financial  system  can  be  seen  from  the  above  line  of  reasoning.  A  period  of 
sustained short‐term interest rates (with the assurance of continued low short rates by 
the central bank) is a highly favorable environment for the taking on of such short‐term 
bets. Adrian and Shin (2008) shows that the Fed Funds rate is an important determinant 
of the growth of securities firms' balance sheets, which in turn has significant effects on 
the  real  economy.  Thus,  there  is  a monetary  policy  angle  to  the  increasing  length  of 
intermediation chains. 
 
 
2. Bust Scenario 
 
Now consider the reversal of the boom scenario whereby perceptions of 
heightened risk raise Value at Risk and induce deleveraging of the financial system, 
leading to lower {λi} . In addition, falls in asset prices and possible credit losses eat 
into the marked-to-market equity levels {ei} . This is a double whammy for the 
financial system as a whole, since in order for the expression in the red balloon to 
stay roughly constant, there has to be substantial increases in {zi} . The increase in 
zi  means that a greater proportion of the funding comes from outside claimholders - 
that is, the funding that banks had granted to each other must now be withdrawn.  
This is a classic run scenario where banks run on other banks. The runs on Northern 
Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers are all instances of such a run.   
 
[Figure 9] Financial Intermediary Run in the Bust Scenario 
 
 
 
The direct manifestation of a run of this type can be given a simpler depiction in 
the following two bank example, taken from Morris and Shin (2008). Bank 1 has 
borrowed from Bank 2. Bank 2 has other assets, as well as its loans to Bank 1. 
Suppose that Bank 2 suffers credit losses on these other loans, but that the 
creditworthiness of Bank 1 remains unchanged. The loss suffered by Bank 2 depletes 
its equity capital. In the face of such a shock, a prudent course of action by Bank 2 is 
to reduce its overall exposure, so that its asset book is trimmed to a size that can be 
carried comfortably with the smaller equity capital. 
From the point of view of Bank 2, the imperative is to reduce its overall lending, 
including its lending to Bank 1. By reducing its lending, Bank 2 achieves its micro-
prudential objective of reducing its risk exposure. However, from Bank 1's 
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perspective, the reduction of lending by Bank 2 is a withdrawal of funding. Unless 
Bank 1 can find alternative sources of funding, it will have to reduce its own asset 
holdings, either by curtailing its lending, or by selling marketable assets. 
In the case where we have the combination of (i) Bank 1 not having alternative 
sources of funding, (ii) the reduction in Bank 2's lending being severe, and (iii) Bank 
1's assets being so illiquid that they can only be sold at fire sale prices, then the 
withdrawal of lending by Bank 2 will feel like a run from the point of view of Bank 1. 
In other words, a prudent shedding of exposures from the point of view of Bank 2 is 
a run from the point of view of Bank 1. Arguably, this type of run is one element of 
what happened to Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. 
 
 
Ⅲ. Prescriptions 
 
 
The prescriptions for moderating the fluctuations associated with the boom and 
busts scenarios can also be understood in terms of the aggregate balance sheet 
identity (2.8). We discuss three in particular - regulatory interventions, various forms 
of forward-looking provisioning, and the reform of the institutions involved in 
financial intermediation. 
 
 
Approach 1. Regulatory Intervention. 
 
The first approach is to moderate the fluctuations in leverage and balance sheet 
size through capital regulation with an explicit countercyclical element, such as the 
countercyclical capital targets advocated in the recent Geneva Report (Brunnermeier 
et al. (2009)) and the Squam Lake Working Group's memo on capital requirements 
(Squam Lake Working Group (2009)). The leverage cap introduced in Switzerland 
recently (Hildebrand (2008)) can also be understood in this connection.  
  
 
 
Leverage caps or countercyclical capital targets aim at restraining the growth of 
leverage {λi}  in boom times so that the corresponding bust phase of the financial 
cycle is less damaging, or can be avoided altogether. In the above expression, 
moderating the fluctuations in {λi}  implies that the marked-to-market equity 
values {ei}  and the outside financing proportions {zi}  can also be kept within 
moderate bounds, so as to prevent the rapid build-up of cross-exposures which are 
then subsequently unwound in a disorderly way as runs against other banks. 
A closely related set of proposals are those that address the composition of assets, 
rather than the capital ratio. The idea is to impose liquidity requirements on the 
banks so as to limit the externalities in the bust phase of the cycle. Cifuentes, Ferrucci 
and Shin (2004) is an early statement of the proposal, subsequently incorporated in 
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the Bank of England's RAMSI framework for systemic risk.3   
Morris and Shin (2008, 2009) describe the rationale for liquidity requirements and 
provides an analysis of the mechanisms invoked. The idea is to take those elements 
that are responsible for the vicious circle of distress and self-reinforcing runs and 
then harness them to create a virtuous  circle of beliefs leading to a stable outcome.  
Liquidity requirements mandate a cushion of cash assets over some interval of time, 
such as requiring banks to maintain reserves at the central bank over some fixed 
maintenance period. Such liquidity requirements can moderate the externalities 
involved in a run by influencing the risks of spillovers across financial intermediaries.  
When a borrower bank has a high level of liquidity, then the withdrawal of funding 
by its creditor banks can be met (at least partly) by its liquid resources, which makes 
the debtor bank less likely to run on other banks. For creditor banks, there are two 
effects. First, knowing that the debtor bank is less vulnerable to runs reduces the 
incentive to run that arises purely from a coordination motive. In addition, when 
each creditor bank realizes that other creditor banks have higher liquidity levels, the 
coordination problem among the creditor banks becomes less sensitive to strategic 
risk - making them less jittery when faced with a run scenario. The more relaxed 
attitude of creditors and debtors are mutually reinforcing, just in the same way that 
distress and concerns about others' viability can be self-reinforcing. In this way, the 
same forces that lead to the vicious circle of run psychology can be harnessed and 
channeled to generate a virtuous circle of stability. 
 
 
Approach 2. Forward-Looking Provisioning. 
 
A second way to moderate fluctuations of the boom bust cycle is to operate 
directly on the equity {ei}  of the banks. The forward-looking statistical 
provisioning scheme that has operated in Spain is a good example of such a method. 
By imposing a provisioning charge when new loans are made, there is a 
corresponding diminution of the equity level of the bank making the loan. For any 
given desired leverage of the bank, a lower equity level means lower total assets, 
hence restraining the rapid growth of balance sheets.   
 
 
 
The Spanish pre-provisioning scheme highlights one of the important lessons in a 
boom4. Under a boom scenario, the problem is that there is too much  equity in the 
banking system. There is overcapacity in the sense that the level of aggregate capital 
is too high. Capital is higher than is consistent with only prudent loans being made. 
                                            
3The Bank of England's RAMSI framework is described in the recent issue of the IMF's Global Financial 
Stability Report (2009, chapter 2). 
4For a description of the Spanish pre-provisioning system, see the Bank of Spain working paper by 
Fernandez, Pages and Saurina (2000). 
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Overcapacity leads to the chasing of yields and the lowering of credit standards. 
Elsewhere (Shin (2009)), I have sketched a mechanism for the emergence of subprime 
lending based on this mechanism. Expanding balance sheets are like an expanding 
balloon. Just as an expanding balloon needs air to fill the balloon, expanding balance 
sheets need new asset creation. But when all prime mortgage borrowers are already 
catered for, lending standards must be lowered in order to generate new assets.  
Hence, subprime lending emerges as a result of the urge to expand balance sheets. 
In the Geneva Report, we discuss the merits of a variant of the Spanish pre-
provisioning scheme called the Pigovian Tax. The idea is that rather than reducing 
equity through a provision, equity can also be lowered in a boom through an explicit 
centralized tax. The tax has the potential to enhance efficiency of the overall financial 
system in the same way that a congestion charge would improve traffic in a city. By 
counteracting an existing inefficiency through a tax, one can counteract the harmful 
externality. Just as with a traffic congestion charge, the revenue raised in the tax is 
not an essential component of the scheme. However, if the revenue raised through 
the Pigovian Tax could be put into a separate bank resolution fund, then the scheme 
would not imply a net transfer away from the banking sector. 
 
 
Approach 3. Structural Reform of Intermediation.   
 
A third approach is more long term, and is aimed at influencing the market 
structure of the financial intermediary sector as a whole. The idea is to restrain the 
lengthening of intermediation chains, and encourage the formation of shorter 
intermediation chains. 
 
 
 
In terms of the aggregate balance sheet identity, the objective is to operate 
directly on the mode of financial intermediation so that the funding profile {zi}  is 
maintained at high levels, thereby limiting the number of intermediaries n  and 
moderating the fluctuations in leverage and total assets. The idea is to induce a 
shortening of the financial intermediation chain by linking ultimate borrowers and 
ultimate lenders more directly. 
One potential way to induce such shortening of the intermediation chain would 
be through the encouragement of the issuance of covered bonds -- bonds issued 
against segregated assets on a bank's balance sheet, with recourse against the issuing 
bank itself. 
The intermediation chain associated with a covered bond is short, since the bank 
holds mortgage claims against ultimate borrowers, and issues covered bonds that 
could be sold directly to households or to long-only institutions such as mutual 
funds or pension funds. The bonds offer longer duration that match the duration of 
the assets. The longer duration of the liabilities have two advantages. First, the 
duration matching between assets and liabilities means that the issuing bank does  
18    韓國開發硏究 / 2010. Ⅰ  
 
 
[Figure 10] Shortening the Intermediation Chain through Covered Bonds 
 
 
 
not engage in maturity transformation in funding. Rigorous application of marking 
to market makes less sense when loans are segregated to back such liabilities. In the 
Geneva Report, we have argued that the accounting treatment of such assets can take 
account of what the banks are capable of holding, rather than simply appealing to 
their intentions, as is the rule under the current mark-to-market regime.   
Second, the fact that liabilities have long duration means that the short-term 
funding that is prevalent in the long intermediation chains will be less likely to be 
employed provided that the covered bonds are held directly by households or by 
long-only institutions such as pension funds and mutual funds. The long duration of 
such securities would be a natural source of sought-after duration for pension funds 
who wish to match the long duration of their pension liabilities. Household savers 
would also find such products a good substitute for government bond funds. The 
shortening of the intermediation chain in this way will have important benefits in 
terms of mitigating the fluctuations in leverage and balance sheet size in the financial 
boom bust cycle.   
Covered bonds have been a familiar feature of many European countries, 
especially in Denmark (with its mortgage bonds) and Germany (with its pfandbriefe).  
But to date, over twenty countries in Europe have some form of covered bonds 
backed by laws that underpin their role in the financial system. Packer, Stever and 
Upper (2007) is a recent overview of the covered bond system, who report that as of 
mid-2007 the outstanding amount of covered bonds reached €1.7 trillion. 
As already discussed, covered bonds are securities issued by a bank and backed 
by a dedicated, segregated group of loans known as a cover pool. The bondholders 
have two safeguards in their holding of covered bonds. First, the bonds are backed 
by the cover pool over which the bondholders have senior claims in case of 
bankruptcy. Second, because the covered bonds are the obligations of the issuing 
bank, the bondholders have recourse to the bank if the cover pool is insufficient to 
meet the bond obligations. In this second sense, covered bonds differ from the U.S.-
style mortgage backed security, which are obligations of the special purpose vehicle - 
a passive company whose sole purpose is to hold assets and issue liabilities against 
those assets. The loans backing the covered bonds stay on the balance sheet of the 
bank, eliminating one step in the intermediation chain, and also guarding against 
Economic Resources and Child Health: An Assessment of Certain Mechanisms    19 
 
 
potential incentive problems in the originate to distribute model of securitization in 
which the originating bank can sell the loan and take it off its balance sheet 
altogether. 
The double protection offered by covered bonds distinguishes them both from 
senior unsecured debt and asset-backed securities (ABSs). In contrast to ABSs, the 
cover pool serves mainly as credit enhancement and not as a means to obtain 
exposure to the underlying assets. Also, cover pools tend to be dynamic in the sense 
that issuers are allowed to replace assets that have either lost some quality or have 
been repaid early. These features imply that covered bonds are seen not so much as 
an instrument to obtain exposure to credit risk, but rather as a higher-yielding 
alternative to government securities. 
These payoff attributes of covered bonds are reflected in the identity of the 
investors who hold them. The identity of the investors is critical in determining the 
funding profile {zi}  of the intermediation sector. The objective of achieving a 
higher funding profile is achieved if the investors are either household savers or non-
bank institutions such as pension funds and mutual funds. A survey of the investors 
in covered bonds was released in May 2009 by the European Covered Bond Dealers 
Association (SIFMA (2009)), and is reproduced in Figure 11 We see that the bulk of 
the investors in covered bonds are non-banks, with the largest category being asset 
management firms. Leveraged institutions and intermediaries constitute only 
around one third of the total. Even within the intermediary sector, institutions such 
as private banks are closer to asset management firms in character than 
intermediaries such as broker dealers who lengthen the intermediation chain. 
Even among covered bonds, the Danish system of mortgage bonds has attracted 
considerable attention recently as a resilient institutional framework for household 
mortgage finance due to the added feature that household mortgage borrowers can 
redeem their debt by purchasing the relevant issue of the mortgage bonds at the 
prevailing market price (see Boyce (2008)). By being able to extinguish debt 
obligations at market prices, household borrowers participate as purchasers in the 
market for mortgage debt, and prevent the type of collapse in mortgage-backed 
securities seen in the United States in the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. 
  The legislation required to underpin the operation of a covered bond system is 
more developed in some regions than others. Europe leads the world in this respect.  
In the European Union, covered bonds are defined by the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD), which limits the range of accepted collateral maximum loan-to-
value ratios. While the CRD only recognizes securities issued under special 
legislation as covered bonds, market participants tend to work with a more general 
definition that also includes bonds issued under private contractual arrangements 
using elements from structured finance. There have been a number of such 
structured covered bonds, primarily in countries without covered bond legislation 
(eg the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States) (see Packer, Stever 
and Upper (2007)). 
Indeed, one of the main hurdles against the widespread introduction of a covered 
bond system has been the legal hurdle of introducing a class of claimholders for the 
cover pool that are senior to the deposit insurance agency, and hence the general 
depositors of the bank. The larger is the cover pool for covered bonds, the smaller is 
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y maintain larger holding of foreign exchange reserves 
y curb the growth of banking sector assets 
y diversify the funding sources for the banking sector. 
 
However, the first two methods have many undesirable economic consequences 
and are unsuitable as a long-term strategy for financial sector resilience. The best 
way to improve the resilience of the Korean financial sector is through the third 
method -- to diversify the funding sources for the banking sector. US-style 
securitization has been shown to be flawed in the current crisis. Instead, the adoption 
of covered bonds (used in Europe for over two hundred years) is a more promising 
long-term strategy to diversify the funding of the banking sector while maintaining 
the stability of the system. 
Foreign exchange reserves held by Korea rose to $227 billion in May, up 
substantially from last autumn in the midst of the liquidity crisis caused by the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. There is an active debate on the appropriate size of 
foreign exchange reserves, with some voices arguing for a continued accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves. Although larger foreign exchange reserves may be 
desirable in the short-term, maintaining large foreign exchange reserves is not a 
feasible or desirable option for Korea in the long-term. 
Maintaining large reserves is costly – it  is tantamount to lending to foreigners at 
a very low interest rate. Given the large and growing US budget deficit and the 
potential for a rapid fall in the value of the US dollar, there is the potential for large 
capital losses on such holdings. Large reserves hinder the smooth functioning of 
domestic monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Korea, as capital inflows have to 
be sterilized by issuing domestic claims. Capital inflows present challenges for 
maintaining domestic liquid reserves at prudent levels. Finally, there are 
international political economy issues. Large foreign exchange reserves expose Korea 
to political pressures from US politicians who may misinterpret Korea's intentions, 
and accuse it of artificially maintaining a weak currency. 
For these reasons, maintaining large foreign exchange reserves is not a desirable 
long-term strategy. Much better would be to reduce the vulnerability of the Korean 
financial sector, so that there is less need to hold large foreign exchange reserves. 
One potential way to reduce the vulnerability of the Korean financial sector is by 
curbing the rapid growth of lending in booms. Restricting the rapid growth of assets 
would mitigate the building up of such vulnerabilities, but such a policy also carries 
large costs. By restricting the growth of assets, lending would be limited to the same 
rate as the growth of retail deposits. However, for a rapidly growing economy, such 
restrictions would impose inefficiently tight restrictions on loans. 
There is also the danger that banks would focus excessively on the availability of 
collateral, so that lending is skewed toward residential real-estate based lending, at 
the expense of financing for firms. Although large companies can tap the capital 
markets, the same is not true of the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) who 
rely heavily on bank lending. Therefore, restricting the growth of assets will have 
potentially undesirable side-effects of choking off lending to SME firms. 
These concerns are magnified by the institutional development in which banks 
have to compete to keep their retail deposits in the face of competition from other 
providers of deposit-like savings instruments, such as money market funds (MMFs) 
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provided by securities firms. Restricting the excessive growth of bank lending 
should form part of the overall strategy for the Korean financial sector, but relying 
on it exclusively will entail undesirable costs. Combining such a policy with a long-
term policy for the diversification of bank funding is important. I turn to this issue 
now. 
US-style securitization in which loans are sold off to special purpose vehicles has 
been shown to be flawed by the current crisis. Securitization was meant to disperse 
risks associated with bank lending so that deep-pocketed investors who were better 
able to absorb losses would share the risks. But as argued already, in reality, 
securitization had the perverse effect of concentrating all the risks in the banking 
system itself. The severity of the global financial crisis, especially in the United States, 
highlights the shortcomings of US-style securitization and the excessive growth of 
the securities industry relative to the real economy. 
One promising alternative to US-style securitization is the institution of covered 
bonds. Covered bonds offer two main benefits. First, by providing a long-term 
domestic source of funding for the banking system, the liability structure of the 
banking sector is made more resilient. The funding becomes (i) long-term and (ii) 
denominated in the domestic currency. For both reasons, covered bonds guard 
against twin crises of liquidity crisis and currency crisis. Second, covered bonds 
provide a long-term savings vehicle for households that (in contrast to bank deposits) 
allow them to hedge against fluctuations in interest rates. The legislation required to 
underpin the operation of a covered bond system is most developed in the European 
Union. Outside Europe, the main hurdle against the widespread introduction of a 
covered bond system is the legal hurdle of introducing a class of claimholders for the 
cover pool that are senior to the deposit insurance agency, and hence the general 
depositors of the bank. However, given the large benefits from providing a stable 
source of domestic funding and providing a long-term savings vehicle, the 
development of the covered bond system deserves greater attention from policy 
makers. 
A possible way to overcome the issue of seniority of depositors is to establish 
specialist "narrow" banks whose liabilities are restricted to covered bonds only, and 
hence whose liabilities are not insured by the deposit insurance agency. Danish 
mortgage banks operate in this way. Indeed, Denmark provides a good illustration 
of how resilience of the financial sector can be combined with active lending for 
domestic mortgage borrowers. Denmark's housing boom was almost as large as that 
of the United States. However, Denmark has not seen a similar financial crisis as in 
the United States. This contrast is largely due to the difference in the financial 
structure and the operation of the covered bond system. 
For Korea, the covered bond system in Denmark (but also in Germany, France, 
Spain and others) would bring the twin advantages of providing a stable source of 
long-term domestic funding, and the provision of a long-term savings vehicle for 
households. 
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Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The organizing theme of this paper has been the overall systemic impact of long 
versus short intermediation chains. Long intermediation chains have been associated 
with the rapid development of the securitized, market-based financial system in the 
United States. I have argued that long intermediation chains carry costs in terms of 
greater amplitude of fluctuations in the boom bust cycle of leverage and balance 
sheet size. Shorter intermediation chains carry benefits for stability of the financial 
system. 
For the financial industry, the key question is to what extent the rapid 
development of securitization and the market-based system can be regarded as the 
norm, or a long, but ultimately temporary stage in the development of a more 
sustainable financial system. Figures 12 and 13 show the growth of four sectors in the 
United States (non-financial corporate sector, household sector, commercial banking 
sector and the security broker-dealer sector) taken from the Federal Reserve's Flow of 
Funds accounts. The series are normalized so that the size in Q1 1954 is set equal to 1. 
Most sectors grew to roughly 80 times its size in 1954, but the broker dealer sector 
grew to around 800 times its 1954 level, before collapsing in the current crisis. Figure 
13 is the same chart, but in log scale. The greater detail afforded by the chart in log 
scale reveals that the securities sector kept pace with the rest of the economy until 
around 1980, but then started a growth spurt that outstripped the other sectors. On 
the eve of the crisis, the securities sector had grown to around ten times its size 
relative to the other sectors in the economy. Clearly, such a pace of growth could not 
go on forever. Even on an optimistic scenario, the growth of the securities sector 
would have tapered off to a more sustainable pace to keep in step with the rest of the 
economy. 
The relative size of the securities sector can be seen as a mirror of the lengthening 
intermediation chains in the market-based system of financial intermediation. One 
could reasonably conclude that some of the baroque flourishes that appeared in the 
Indian summer of the expansion of the securities sector (such as the growth of exotic 
asset-backed securities such as CDO-squared) have gone for good, and are unlikely 
to feature in a steady state of the securities sector.   
Overall, it would be reasonable to speculate that the securities sector that emerges 
from the current crisis in sustainable form will be smaller, with shorter 
intermediation chains, perhaps less profitable in aggregate, and with less maturity 
transformation. The backdrop to this development will be the regulatory checks and 
balances that are aimed at moderating the fluctuations in leverage and balance sheet 
size that were instrumental in making the current financial crisis the most severe 
since the Great Depression. 
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[Figure 12] Growth of Four US Sectors (1954Q1 = 1) (source: Flow of Funds, 
Federal Reserve) 
 
 
[Figure 13] Growth of Four US Sectors (1954Q1 = 1)(in log scale) 
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